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ARTICLES
The Curious Case of Dr. Jekyll and the Estate Tax Marital Deduction:
Should Prenuptial Agreements Alter the Relationship?
Kelly Moore .............................................................................255
The tax code bestows various benefits upon married taxpayers based
on the presumption that married individuals form a single economic
unit and should be taxed accordingly. This article explores this
presumption in cases where the married individuals’ interactions are
governed by a prenuptial agreement. Should married taxpayers be
treated as economic units when they have entered an agreement
allowing them to deviate from the state law burdens of marriage
otherwise imposed? This article explores this question in the context
of the estate tax marital deduction, which allows a 100% deduction
for the value of property passing from a decedent to a surviving
spouse, so long as the property passes outright or in a statute sanctioned form to the decedent’s surviving spouse. The discussion
requires an exploration of the historical origins of the estate tax
marital deduction and a survey of common terms found in prenuptial
agreements. A simple declaration that the tax benefits should be
denied when the burdens of marriage are sufficiently avoided begs
the questions: (1) what level of deviation from state law imposed
burdens should trigger denial of the 100% estate tax marital deduction, and (2) if denied, should the predecessor to the 100% deduction
be employed, or should some other deduction regime be created for
this scenario? Because of the inherent complexities evinced by these
follow-up questions, the article concludes that, although policy
arguments may support denying the deduction in certain situations,
practical considerations demand that the tax benefits not be impacted
by the presence of a prenuptial agreement.

The Constitutionality of Government Fees as Applied to the Poor
Henry Rose ..............................................................................293
The United States Supreme Court has frequently addressed the
constitutionality of government fees that indigent persons cannot
afford to pay, relying on due process or equal protection principles to
decide these cases. The most recent decision by the Supreme Court
involving this issue, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), relied on a
confusing analysis of the applicable constitutional principles. This
Article proposes that courts should apply the traditional equal
protection analysis to decide this important constitutional issue in the
future.
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Federal Constitutional Childcare Interests and Superior Parental Rights
in Illinois
Jeffrey Parness .........................................................................305
After In re Marriage of Mancine and other recent Illinois decisions, a
question lingers for Illinois legislators and judges: “Is filial love
something to be dangled and then snatched away, promised and then
reneged upon?” While the question is difficult, many with no natural
or formal adoptive ties who have developed “familial bonds” with
children should have childcare interests (and, perhaps, superior
parental rights). As occurs in other family settings, like premarital and
open adoption pacts, certain family-related agreements on childcare
deserve explicit statutory recognition. Expanded voluntary acknowledgment and guardianship opportunities should also be available to
establish new avenues of childcare interests. The Proposed Parentage
Act and Proposed Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act are steps
in the right direction. But even with enactment, more statutory
guidelines (and some common law) will be required to promote “filial
love” for deserving children and all who care for them. The General
Assembly should address a broad array of “established familial or
family-like bonds,” or invite judicial action, as courts will often
“decline to go where the legislature has not led.”

When Rain Falls, Insurance Companies Should Listen: Determining
“Weather” an Insurance Policy’s Exclusion or Inclusion of Property in
the Open Refers to Property Simply Left Outside or Property Exposed
to the Elements
Marcus Jackson Jones ..............................................................355
This article explores the meaning of in the open in the context of
insurance policy interpretation. This issue, which has been addressed
by several state and federal courts, has existed for over forty
years. This Article explores the possibility that the misinterpretation of
this phrase exists solely because courts have employed the wrong part
of speech. For example, insurance policies generally prohibit coverage for property destroyed while in the open – the noun part of
speech. Hence, in these policies, in the open is used to signify a
location. However, courts have chosen to interpret the insurance
policies as prohibiting coverage for open property – the adjective part
of speech. This Article argues this interpretation is misplaced. Additionally, the Article concludes that courts should use the
noun part of speech and find that in the open refers to property simply
left outside, irrespective of whether it is protected or unprotected from
the elements.

Is Torture Justified in Terrorism Cases?: Comparing U.S. and European
Views
Stephen Hoffman .....................................................................379
Popular opinion regarding torture has changed significantly in the
wake of 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks, with people in affected
countries generally becoming more accepting of it as an interrogation
tactic. This increase is especially notable where the torture of a few
can save the lives of many, particularly where there is little time to
pursue other, less-invasive means of interrogation—the so-called
“ticking bomb” scenario. This Article discusses three key ethical
theories of torture and compares the legal status of torture in the
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United States and the European Union, concluding that circumstances
may require its use when necessary to save many lives.

COMMENTS
The Man Behind the Mask: Defamed Without a Remedy
Bryant Storm ..........................................................................393
Defamation law is a balance between the right of one person to speak
and the right of another person to cure injuries to their reputation.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act has substantially
altered the careful equilibrium that is defamation law. In an effort to
protect the flow of ideas and speech on the internet, Congress created a new law that upends traditional defamation law. The sweeping
immunities that section 230 grants upon publishers, republishers, and
distributors has had the effect of invalidating what were once otherwise legitimate causes of action in defamation. After the enactment of
section 230, many potential plaintiffs in internet defamation actions
are faced with a situation where they have no defendant because the
potential defendants are either anonymous or immune. This Comment
considers the prudence of a law like section 230, challenges the
nature of defamation laws new and old, and asks whether the policies
our laws are founded upon are policies that remain important to us.

Limits on School Disciplinary Authority over Online Student Speech
Steve Varel ................................................................................... 423
When, if ever, can a public secondary school in the United States
legally discipline a student for the content of a personal website, a
Facebook post, a text message, or an email that the student created
or transmitted from an off-campus location? The U.S. Supreme Court
has never addressed the issue, and the lower courts have split on it,
providing a number of different answers to the question. In answering this question, this Comment distinguishes between two kinds of
off-campus internet speech: (1) threats or incitements to violence that
are never protected by the First Amendment in any context (“true
threats”), and (2) other kinds of speech the First Amendment would
protect if the speaker were an adult in a public forum. This Comment
argues that there should be limits on school disciplinary authority
over both of these kinds of speech. Threats or incitements to violence
serious enough to fall outside the scope of constitutional protection
may always subject a speaker to criminal punishment. Therefore, this
Comment argues that students should not additionally be subject to
school discipline for such unprotected speech unless the speech has
some connection (a “sufficient nexus”) to the school. This rule has
the advantage of allowing schools to discipline students for threats
related to the school while also preventing school authority from a
limitless extension into matters so unrelated to the school that they
should only be handled by authorities. In contrast to its position on
unprotected “true threats,” this Comment argues that schools should
never be allowed to discipline students for off-campus internet speech
that would be protected by the First Amendment if it occurred outside
the school context. In cases involving speech that occurred at school,
the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District and its progeny, that schools
may discipline students for speech that causes “substantial disruption” to school activities. But, this Comment argues that, since
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Tinker and its progeny were designed specifically for the school
setting, the school speech rules articulated in Tinker and its progeny
should never be applied to off-campus speech. Although others have
made that argument, this Comment goes further by attempting to
clearly define when speech occurs on campus and when it occurs off
campus. It argues that speech originally created or transmitted off
campus may only be considered on-campus speech if it is intentionally (re)communicated by the student while he or she is on campus. It
further argues that the Spence v. Washington test for communicative
conduct should be used to decide if internet speech was intentionally
communicated on campus. This Comment concludes with a discussion
of how the rule it proposes should apply in specific situations that
schools are likely to face in the future.
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